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Taking Animals Seriously: Interpreting  
and Institutionalizing Human-Animal  
Relations in Modern Democracies 
Thomas Saretzki ∗ 
Abstract: »Tiere ernstgenommen: Interpretation und Institutionalisierung von 
Mensch-Tier-Beziehungen in modernen Demokratien«. Zoopolis by Sue Don-
aldson and Will Kymlicka (2011) is a very important contribution in the process 
of rethinking our relationship with animals. But is their proposal to conceptual-
ize animals as co-citizens (in the case of domesticated animals) or as sovereign 
communities (in the case of wild animals) appropriate and persuasive with re-
gard to the task of restructuring the theoretical foundations and the practical 
perspectives for transforming human-animal relations in modern democracies? 
In the face of the epistemological and methodological problems of interpreting 
animals and their behavior, this contribution argues that we are not on the 
right track if we try to take animals seriously by interpreting the relationship 
between them and us without realizing that it will not be possible to com-
municate with them on a level that can capture the political dimensions of that 
relationship. While expanding our moral imagination to see animals in new 
ways may induce new commitments and yield new allies for the animal advo-
cacy movement, the next step required would be to proceed from an extended 
moral imaginary towards a political theory of human-animal relations which 
includes perspectives on institutionalization that can come to terms with the 
problems of moral advocacy in a democracy. 
Keywords: Animals, human-animal relations, Zoopolis, anthropomorphism, in-
terpretation, advocacy, institutionalization, citizenship, democracy. 
1.  Introduction 
As new information on the mistreatment of animals is circulating in the media, 
more and more people are concerned about the way animals are used in indus-
trialized countries. The call for changes in established practices is looming 
large. In media discourses and political arenas, the issues are often framed as 
questions of responsible lifestyles or consumer patterns, especially with regard 
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to what we should or should not eat. The growing significance of food politics 
coincides with an uprising of animal advocacy. At the same time, animal advo-
cacy is confronted with questions concerning the (re-)definition of its agenda 
and its self-understanding. Is an improvement of existing animal welfare poli-
cies enough? Should the traditional critique of animal exploitation be supple-
mented or even replaced by a critique of animal enslavement? And if so, is it 
possible to conceive of new political forms of “animal liberation” without 
falling into the snares of militant activism? At least those who become aware of 
the intensity and extent of animal mistreatment in industrial societies begin to 
raise and seriously consider fundamental questions that go beyond animal 
welfare. They wonder about what our duties vis-à-vis animals really are, 
whether or not these traditionally accepted duties have to be redefined in light 
of new developments, and how such a transformation of our relationship with 
animals might be brought about. 
Zoopolis by Sue Donaldson and Will Kymlicka (2011) is a timely and very 
important contribution in the ongoing process of rethinking our relationship 
with animals. While this involves many issues, in this contribution I am going 
to focus on conceptual concerns and ask: Is Donaldson’s and Kymlicka’s pro-
posal to conceptualize animals as co-citizens (in the case of domesticated ani-
mals) or as sovereign communities (in the case of wild animals) appropriate 
and persuasive with regard to the task of restructuring the theoretical founda-
tions and the practical perspectives for transforming human-animal relations in 
modern democracies? 
In my contribution, I do not want to raise questions concerning the norma-
tive premise that humans have moral duties or should follow normative princi-
ples in their political actions with regard to human-animal relations (Donaldson 
and Kymlicka 2011, 4). However, I do want to problematize the theoretical 
premises and consequences of their proposal to view animals as co-citizens or 
to conceptualize communities of wild animals as sovereign. For the sake of 
discussion, I will subsume these problematizations under two headings and will 
formulate them as two basic questions: a critical question on interpretation and 
a practical question on institutionalization. 
2.  Interpreting Animals, Their Behavior and Their Relation 
to Humans: Whose Perspective, Whose Concepts? 
Many passages in Donaldson’s and Kymlicka’s (2011) chapters on domesticat-
ed or wild animals remind me of my experiences in the village I grew up in. I 
lived in close contact with the variety of animals one can imagine as being part 
of the good old farms with woods and pastures before the wave of agriculture’s 
intensified industrialization. While most interactions with animals as a little 
boy were friendly and pleasant, some were not. Trying to make sense of these 
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mixed experiences, I asked my grandma who was both a farmer’s daughter and 
also another farmer’s widow. She told me:  
If you did not get along well with some animals even if you wanted to be kind 
to them, it doesn’t have to be the case that they dislike you or even tried to 
hurt you. It might have been that you just did not understand each other 
properly. Listen, here’s the lesson that you should not forget when you meet 
animals: Don’t assume that they see the world as we do! Always remember: 
they have their own perception und rules of behavior and their own ideas of 
how the world is and should be working! And even if we can watch them over 
a longer period of time and try to understand them, we can never be sure that 
they understood us properly or that we understood them properly, since we 
and they cannot talk to each other in order to reach an agreement that we and 
they understand in the same way. 
Why am I recalling this story that I am sure a lot of people have experienced in 
one way or another in their interaction with animals? Because I think that in 
spite of its familiar simplicity, grandma’s lesson still points to a fundamental 
problem of thinking about human-animal relations: we cannot presume that 
they see the world as we do. Since we cannot talk to them, we cannot be sure 
that we reach a common understanding with them, especially when it comes to 
complex social regulations. Hence I would argue that this basic problem of 
intersubjectivity between humans and animals reappears in any kind of political 
theory that applies concepts derived from a human polity (such as citizenship 
or sovereignty) to animals and their forms of social behavior. The human-
animal relationship is an asymmetric relation, at least as far as communication 
beyond the level of dyads between individual humans and individual animals is 
concerned. When we reach the level of politics, it is we who interpret the rela-
tionship. They cannot tell us what they want from the other animals or from us 
in political terms. When we reach complex levels of social interaction it all 
comes down to us. 
Let me take the question of the possibility and the limits of interpretation 
and mutual understanding regarding political concepts one step further to the 
domain of scientific research on animals. Knowledge from this domain is often 
simply presented as “objective” scientific evidence about the world of animal 
life as it is. Looking more closely, however, we are not only confronted with 
different theories that biologists have formulated to explain animal behavior. If 
we try to understand how biologists produce knowledge about animal behavior 
and reflect on the methodology of field studies in behavioral biology, we learn 
that these researchers have to come up with protocols about their observations 
in the field in the first place. Researchers have to translate what they have 
observed with their senses into descriptions in the form of basic statements. In 
order to communicate with other members of research communities they have 
to use language. Thinking about human-animal relations more broadly, we 
have to realize that not only in everyday communication, but also in biological 
research, it is us again: we use our language to describe what they (the animals) 
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are doing. Anybody who has ever worked in that field will soon become aware 
that it is really problematic to use the language we are familiar with from describ-
ing and interpreting human behavior for animals. If we describe what we have 
seen by putting ourselves in their shoes, we have to realize that such descriptions 
presuppose that animals actually perceive and experience the world the way we 
do. A description that implicitly takes their perspective, but uses our language 
is based on an imagined reciprocity, if not on pure speculation, since we cannot 
ascertain and, therefore, should not presuppose that their ways of seeing and 
experiencing the world are like ours. This fundamental problem of studying 
and interpreting animal behavior becomes ever more obvious if we climb down 
the ladder of animal orders from higher vertebrates such as mammals, birds and 
reptiles to insects, mollusks and other so-called “lower” species which still 
belong to what we call the animal kingdom. 
It has a history in theology and its philosophical critique, yet the classical 
term used by reflective ethologists and philosophers of science for critical 
reflection about this basic epistemological and methodological problem in 
interpreting animals and their behavior is “anthropomorphism” – describing 
and conceptualizing other entities like god or organisms in the natural world in 
a language that was developed with reference to human beings and that carries 
meaning which makes sense with regard to human thinking and conduct. An-
other word for such an epistemologically and methodologically unreflective 
approach is “humanizing” concepts of animal life, i.e. conceptualizing their 
behavior as if they were like us, as if they were humans. 
So here is my critical question: If we want to take animals seriously, is it an 
appropriate way to conceptualize (a) their world and their way of living or (b) the 
relationship between their world and ours in terms such as citizenship or sover-
eignty – terms that we invented and keep on using to interpret complex social 
relationships between humans at the same time? Is it not that an interpretation 
that is based on a projection of concepts that have meaning for our ways of social 
interaction and complex organization onto the world of animals or even ecologi-
cal communities – communities that embrace multi-species relationships, some of 
them cooperative, some of them not? If we continue on this line of interpretation, 
does not the next step lead us to some kind of conceptual paternalism with nor-
mative implications that are hard to avoid? In the end we could find ourselves in 
a situation that might be familiar from interactions with other formerly “depend-
ent” communities that we “liberated” or that we urged to “liberate” themselves by 
following our concepts of constituting a way of living. 
We cannot know whether they would accept these concepts as a valid inter-
pretation of the way their communities are organized since we cannot talk to 
them about these conceptual questions and thus cannot ascertain whether or 
not this would be appropriate to their understanding. Does this not suggest that 
we should be more cautious before we start projecting our concepts on their 
communities and try to be as unassuming as we can when interpreting their 
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behavior and social organization? And if we can only talk about them among 
ourselves, i.e. to other humans, who is it that we are really trying to address 
when we transfer our contestable normative concepts of our way of living and 
self-organization to their behavior and their communities? 
Concepts like citizenship or sovereignty are our concepts for our way of liv-
ing. We can reinterpret and extend them for example in the direction of an 
animal friendly, animal respecting or even animal caring concept of citizenship 
for us, expressing our identities as citizens of our political communities. But if 
we take animals seriously, we cannot project our self-understanding on them 
and then proceed in a counterfactual “as if mode,” i.e. thinking of them and 
interacting with them as if they behaved or organized themselves according to 
our concept of citizenship. 
In other words, I would argue that interpreting their way of living in terms 
of our political concepts is misleading. And if we did, it would leave us with 
basic conceptual ambiguities. We would end up with two fundamentally different 
concepts of citizenship: one concept of citizenship for us and one concept of 
citizenship for them. And we would find the same ambiguity with the concept of 
sovereignty. Would such ambiguity help in terms of theory or sorting out the 
issues and options with regard to rethinking the human-animal relationship? 
3.  Moral Imagination and Political Theory: Legitimating 
Animal Advocacy or Institutionalizing Human-Animal 
Relationships? 
Donaldson and Kymlicka (2011, 24) characterize the second part of Zoopolis 
entitled “applications” as a “journey,” as a “sketching out of a more positive 
vision of human-animal relations.”  
It is an exercise in expanding the moral imagination to see animals not solely 
as vulnerable and suffering individuals but also as neighbors, friends, co-
citizens, and members of communities ours and theirs. 
No doubt, the story line of their journey captures the feeling and the imagination 
of a number of people. Many readers (like the author of this comment) who care 
about animals may spontaneously think: This is how I personally feel about ani-
mals living with me or at least next to me, and how I could imagine the future of 
a good life for mixed communities of animals and humans. Yet, on second 
thoughts, many of these readers will also realize that if we see animals in this way 
and if at least that part of our self that cares about living with animals likes to 
imagine such a positively defined human-animal relationship in the future, then 
the attractiveness of that vision for us does not necessarily imply that most of our 
fellow countrymen and women share this feeling for animals or will also be 
attracted by this “moral imagination.” They may simply see and interpret the 
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human-animal relationship in a different way and act accordingly. And today, in 
fact, most of them do. Moreover, our fellow countrymen and -women are also 
citizens of our existing polities who have the same rights as we do – rights grant-
ed and protected by their citizenship status. Finally, in liberal polities, these rights 
protect their private domain from political interventions and put constraints on 
our sovereignty as a political community. 
In liberal polities, existing institutions provide a basic line between the pub-
lic and the private. And their existing legal frameworks entail private property 
rights that clearly locate the right to interpret and define any positive aspect of 
human-animal relations for most domesticated animals on the private side. 
Beyond the restraints of existing laws for animal welfare, which every citizen 
has the duty to respect properly, there are no restrictions. We could imagine 
animals any way we wanted to. We could see them according to the existing 
limited or to some kind of expanded “moral imagination” such as the one out-
lined by Donaldson and Kymlicka (2011, 24) that I would interpret as an ethi-
cal vision of their and our good life. And we could or could not treat animals 
accordingly. Within the existing institutional setting it is up to us, it is our 
private decision. The animals themselves simply have to live with whatever we 
decide. At least most domesticated animals are objects of different interpreta-
tions of their good life and of good relationships with their human owners by 
their human owners.  
Whether we like it or not, we do not live in “a world that takes seriously the 
idea that animals and humans can co-exist, interact, and even cooperate on the 
basis of justice and equality” (Donaldson and Kymlicka 2011, 24). We live in a 
world in which most humans view their domesticated animals as commodities 
subject to economic calculations and the rules of private property. In practice, 
even the fundamental negative animal rights have not been invented by the 
animals themselves, by some hypothetical human-animal coalition or by some 
other entity beyond this world. These rights have been invented and to a certain 
degree implemented by humans as a result of political actions by humans, who 
– often against the resistance of other humans – acted as animal rights’ advo-
cates. Thus, even the invention of animal rights itself is a result of humans 
acting as advocates on behalf of animals and claiming to represent the best 
interests of the animals to be protected. 
But – as we know from many other fields involving moral issues and moral 
commitments – the decision to become an advocate for a certain policy with 
moral implications in and by itself does not justify one’s stance to become the 
legitimate public order in a democracy. Almost all kinds of advocacy are likely 
to have their adversaries – and the interesting question in terms of reflecting 
their political dimensions is whether or not and eventually how its reflective 
practitioners can come up with a political imagination that embraces not only 
their followers, but also the other members of modern societies who have dif-
ferent visions and concerns. 
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I would argue that this is where the political dimension comes into our discus-
sion about the human-animal relationship (see Ahlhaus and Niesen 2015, in this 
HSR Forum). To put it in very simple and basic terms: the primary space of the 
political in this relationship is not between humans and animals. The political 
space is a space between humans. And it is opening up (or closing down) because 
we humans have different views, normative principles, values and interests in 
relation to animals and hence about the way we as a democratic society can and 
should structure or transform this relationship in political terms. 
So a political theory about the human-animal relationship should not just be 
concerned about expanding (or reducing) our “moral imagination” to view 
animals in one way or another. To focus on the expansion of “moral imagina-
tion” about the future of human-animal relations would limit political perspec-
tives and turn its practical orientation into something like a moral campaign 
trying to convince as many fellow citizens as possible that a positive vision 
such as the communitarian one outlined by Donaldson and Kymlicka is the best 
concept of the good life both for humans and for animals. Yet such a strategy 
would not only neglect the fact that in most industrial societies most citizens 
have different visions of their good life in relation to animals. It would also 
disregard the fact that most of the existing institutional frameworks of liberal 
democracies limit the sovereignty of their democratic political institutions vis-
à-vis the domain of private decision-making about the fate of animals by defin-
ing them as private property. Thus a political theory of human-animal relations 
should also be concerned with how we communicate in our controversies and 
interact in our conflicts about these relationships and the legal settings that 
predefine the matter of these conflicts as public or private. It should offer some 
ideas about how we can and should deliberate and decide upon issues related to 
animals and how we can and should institutionalize these processes of delibera-
tion and decision-making about our relationships with them. Since animals 
cannot speak for themselves, to repeat the truism, their interests and concerns 
have to be interpreted by humans if they are to be taken into account in the 
political process at all. 
So here is my practical question: While our “moral imagination” to see an-
imals in new ways may induce new commitments and attract new allies for the 
animal advocacy movement, can we expect that this new moral imaginary will 
be accepted, let alone implemented, by all or even a majority of people in mod-
ern societies in their daily practices simply because of its attractiveness? While 
the aim of Zoopolis was to supplement traditional animal rights theory, does 
this expanded “moral imagination” of animal advocates also provide a persua-
sive exercise in expanding our political imagination in terms of a viable and 
legitimate strategy? Or what would be the next step in proceeding from this 
extended moral imagination towards a political imagination that can come to 
terms with the problems of moral advocacy in a democracy? 
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4.  Conclusion 
Should we see and treat domesticated animals as co-citizens and wild animals 
as sovereign? Are citizenship and sovereignty good conceptual starting points 
for rethinking the human-animal relationship? I am skeptical as to whether or 
not we are on the right track if we try to take animals seriously by interpreting 
the relationship between them and us without realizing that most of them are 
very different from us and that it will not be possible to communicate with 
them on a level that can capture the political dimensions of that relationship. 
Thus, my reasoning with regard to the question of interpretation leads me to 
say: No, we should neither interpret animals nor our relationship with them in 
these terms. But if we think of our relationship with other citizens within dem-
ocratic communities – and this is where the political dimension comes in – I 
would say: Yes, citizenship theory and concepts of sovereignty can help to 
think about issues of institutionalization within the human domain. Theories 
about citizenship are not only about rights and duties. They can also offer ori-
entation on how we interpret ourselves as citizens and how sovereign we want 
our democratic political institutions to be in relation to private prerogatives 
when it comes to conceiving and treating animals in one way or another. 
The conceptual problem for a political theory of human-animal relations, I 
would argue, is twofold: It has to come to terms not only with one, but with two 
different kinds of relationships: the relationship between humans and animals 
and the relationship between different groups of humans who have different 
views on how to interpret human-animal relations and how to structure and 
regulate them in the political domain. On the one hand, such a theory would 
have to work on an analytical framework that provides appropriate concepts for 
the analysis of the political dimensions of the structure, the function, and the 
dynamics of existing human practices in relation to animals. On the other hand, 
if it were to be a political theory with practical intent, it would have to explicate 
and justify a normative framework that provides the reference for practical 
judgements and orientation for political strategies to change existing forms of 
human-animal relationships in a democratic way. 
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